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Hypothetical, not Fictional Worlds 
Friedel Weinert 
This paper critically analyzes the fiction-view of scientific modeling, which exploits 
presumed analogies between literary fiction and model building in science. The basic 
idea is that in both fiction and scientific modeling fictional worlds are created. The 
paper argues that the fiction-view comes closest to certain scientific thought 
experiments, especially those involving demons in science and to literary movements 
like naturalism. But the paper concludes that the dissimilarities prevail over the 
similarities. The fiction-view fails to do justice to the plurality of model types used in 
science; it fails to realize that a function like idealization only makes sense in science 
because models, unlike works of fiction, can be de-idealized; it fails to distinguish 
sufficiently between the make-believe (fictional) worlds created in fiction and the 
hypothetical (as-if) worlds envisaged in models. Representation characterized in the 
fiction-view as a license to draw inferences does not sufficiently distinguish between 
inferences in fiction from inferences in scientific modeling. To highlight the contrast 
the paper proposes to explicate representation in terms of satisfaction of constraints. 
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I. Introduction 
It is commonly agreed today that scientific theories represent the external world via 
models, of which there are many different kinds. Theories are very general in nature, 
whilst models represent particular systems. There are also different accounts of 
‘representation’ – from isomorphism and similarity to fit. In a recent development 
several writers (R. Frigg, P. Godfrey-Smith) have emphasized affinities between 
scientific modeling and literary fiction. This new focus removes the representational 
force of models even further from previous accounts in terms of isomorphism and 
similarity. In this new approach, an argument by analogy is used to underline that 
both scientific models and literary fiction deal with ‘imaginary worlds’. The claim is 
that this analogy can shed new light on the role of modeling in the natural sciences.  
The purpose of this contribution is to critically analyze this thesis: a) by testing it 
against a form of model, which is not often discussed in the literature, but seems 
close to the new approach (i.e., the use of demons in scientific thought experiments); 
b) by comparing it with literary examples, in particular the literary movement of 
naturalism. Thought experiments involving demons are used in both science and 
philosophy as argument patterns to test the potential and limits of knowledge claims 
about the natural world. The paper will focus on Laplace’s and Maxwell’s demons.   
They present conceptual models, which allow their users to explore the coherence 
and consistency of accepted knowledge claims or to present bold new hypotheses, 
like Einstein’s hypothesis of the equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass. 
Einstein used his celebrated elevator thought experiment to illustrate his discovery. 
The demons of science, as well as naturalism, suggest themselves for a critical 
analysis of the fiction-view, because of their apparent closeness to the fictional 
account. The paper will therefore start with a sympathetic approach to the fiction-view 
of scientific modeling and, like the role of demons in scientific thinking, explore its 
potential. The first task will be to understand the thesis, namely the assumed close 
relationship between scientific modeling and literary fiction. Although the fictional 
nature of the demons of science, and realistic works of fiction, seem to support this 
view, it turns out that there are significant differences between modeling in science 
and literary fiction. The proponents of the fiction-view tend to forget that there are no 
analogies without disanalogies. These disanalogies come to light with the notion of 
representation. Once these disanalogies are taken into account the similarities 
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between these two activities – telling fictional stories and constructing scientific 
models – are very superficial. The devil lies in the details.  
II. The Fiction-view of Scientific Modeling 
The fiction-view of scientific modeling consists of two parts: on the negative side it 
rejects semantic and structuralist views of modeling, with their tendency to 
emphasize relations like isomorphism and similarity between the model system and 
the target system. The latter is usually taken to be some aspect or part of the natural 
world. On the positive side it proposes to exploit analogies between model-systems 
and works of fiction. The central contention is that ‘models are akin to places and 
characters of literary fictions’, rather than, say, Vaihinger’s broader notion of fiction.1 
The analogy is based on the claim that model-systems are often treated ‘as imagined 
concrete things of literary fiction.’2 The main motivation for the fiction-view is 
threefold, according to Giere3: 
a) Scientists sometimes invoke fictions, which envisage unrealizable or 
unrealized scenarios, as is certainly the case when demons are employed in 
scientific argumentation; 
b) many scientific models are physically impossible to realize: think for instance 
of an idealized pendulum, friction-free surfaces in classical mechanics or 
indeed Einstein’s elevator thought experiment; 
c) theoretical models represent idealized entities. This type of model has a long 
history: consider for instance planetary models, whether of the geocentric or 
heliocentric type, which employ circular orbits and neglect planetary moons. 
The fiction-view gains further support from the extensive use of idealizations and 
abstractions in scientific modeling. In abstraction, the human mind deliberately 
factors out certain parameters, which may have a measurable effect on the system 
under consideration. Thus Newton’s inverse square law of gravitation allows the 
computation of the gravitational attraction between two particular bodies (say the 
Earth and the moon) but the gravitational influence of all other celestial bodies on the 
Earth-moon system is deliberately neglected, even though it exists. 
In idealization, inaccuracies and small deviations are ‘straightened out’ in order to 
arrive at a pure type, which may be easier to describe or compute. In many models of 
1Frigg, 2010, 99; Fine, 1993 
2Godfrey-Smith, 2006, 736; cf. Godfrey-Smith, 2009, 91 
3Giere, 2008, §1; cf. Frigg, 2010, 100-103 
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the solar system the orbit of planets is depicted as circular, even though it is elliptical 
to different degrees, because a circular orbit is easier to calculate than an elliptical 
one. 
Due to these abstractions and idealizations models are ‘at a remove’ from the real 
target system. Hence it is tempting to say that they create possible worlds or 
imaginary systems, which are analogous to fictional accounts. Although scientific 
models are idealized systems, they nevertheless have the function of representing 
their target system. The proponents of the fiction-view understand representation in 
different ways: for instance indirect representation via similarity relations4  or as a 
license to draw ‘inferences from the model to the target system.’5 One question, 
which arises, is whether this representational element is also present in literary fiction 
or whether the inferences are of the same type in both cases.  
The proposed similarity between literary fiction and scientific models further implies 
that there is no clear distinction between fictional accounts, thought experiments – as 
for instance in the use of demons – and scientific modeling.6 The reason for this 
fuzzy boundary between scientific models, literary accounts and thought experiments 
is that literary and non-literary thought experiments can be understood as conceptual 
models. As such they have many similarities with other models: they contain 
abstractions and idealizations and therefore describe ‘fictional worlds’. But 
conceptual models in science also have representational functions because, like 
other scientific models, they aim at an investigation of real-world target systems.  
In his analysis of the anatomy of scientific modeling, Frigg introduces a distinction 
between p-representation and t-representation.  
P-representation ascribes properties to a fictional system. It is a description of an 
imaginary scenario, whereby a model system provides a description or attribution of 
fictional properties (but not, according to Frigg, fictional objects in order to avoid 
ontological commitments). This description should be ‘understood by way of props in 
games of make-believe’. This function gains its credibility from the pretense theory of 
4Godfrey-Smith, 2006, Fn6 
5Frigg, 2010, Introduction 
6Frigg, 2010, 121-5 
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fiction. As a description is not inherently representational, a model must also be 
equipped with an additional representational function.  
T-representation carries the representational force of the model. A model system 
denotes a target system. It incorporates a relation between the model system and the 
target system.  Frigg uses a map analogy to characterize t-representation: 
The view that I am proposing is that one can think of a model-system as a kind 
of “generalized map” and explain how it represents (t-represents) its target 
along the lines of how maps represent their targets.7 
 
As an example Frigg uses the Newtonian model of the sun-Earth system. Its aim is to 
describe the Earth’s orbit around the sun. However, given the huge number of 
different models in the natural and social sciences – from scale models, analogue 
models, conceptual models, functional models, hypothetical (as-if) models, ideal 
types, structural models – the question arises whether the map-analogy captures the 
essence of scientific modeling in general. Frigg claims that 
‘model-systems are t-representations in the same way in which  maps are: 
they denote a target system and certain facts obtain in them (…) which are 
then translated into claims about a target system by using a key.8 
 
In the case of scientific modeling two types of keys are highlighted. 
The simplest of all keys is identity, the rule according to which facts in the 
model (or at least a suitably defined class of facts) are also facts in the world. 
For example, if X t-represents Y by identity, then it follows from the fact that X 
has discrete energy levels that Y has discrete energy levels too.9 
But identity has obvious limitations. A simple scale model of the solar system will 
represent the spatial distribution of the planets; it will often neglect its moons and 
present circular rather than elliptical orbits. It may not accurately represent the 
distances between the planets and their distance from the sun. Even a simple visible 
scale model will make abstractions from the real solar system and idealize their orbits 
to circular motion. The scale model is not a mirror image of the real system. A 
Newtonian model can also be a more abstract structural model, which combines 
7Frigg, 2010, 100 
8Frigg, 2010, 128 
9Frigg, 2010, 131; italics in original 
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algebraic and topological features, without being identical with the facts of the real 
system. The need for idealizations is stressed in the second example of a key. 
A more interesting key is the ideal limit key. Many model-systems are 
idealizations of the target in one way or another. A common kind of 
idealizations is to “push to the extreme” a property that a system possesses. 
This happens when we model particles as point masses, strings as massless, 
planets as spherical, and surfaces as frictionless.10 
Many models t-represent their target systems not only via idealization but also by 
way of abstraction. The fundamental idea is that model-systems are built to t-
represent target-systems. The emphasis on systems highlights a further function of 
models. Models typically select a limited number of parameters in order to represent 
a relationship between them, either spatial ordering (topological features as in 
planetary models) or mathematical ordering (algebraic features as in atom models).11  
This further function – let’s call it ‘systematization’ – is due to the fact that science 
deals with systems (rather than disparate facts) and that a system consists of a 
certain number of components and an interaction between them. Thus the solar 
system consists of nine planets (including Pluto) and the way the planets interact with 
each other and with the sun either through gravitation (Newton) or the curvature of 
space-time (Einstein). 
A further important feature of scientific modeling is that these functions – abstraction, 
idealization, systematization – come in degrees, which means that features can be 
modified in more advanced models. This aspect of modeling will be called 
‘factualization’. The existence of these functions in scientific models plays an 
important part in the evaluation of the fiction-view. 
The fiction analogy only strictly applies to p-representation, since it is doubtful, as will 
be argued below, that most fictional accounts have a representational function in the 
way that scientific models do. An analysis of the fiction-view of modeling must 
therefore operate on two levels.  
The first question is whether there is a strong enough similarity between p-
representation in literary fiction and scientific modeling to justify the label ‘fiction-view’ 
10Frigg, 2010, 131; italics in original 
11On algebraic and topological features in models, see Weinert, 1999 
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of scientific modeling. The second question breaks down into two parts: why t-
representation, as it exists in scientific models, does not feature in fictional accounts 
(with some exceptions); and whether scientific modeling is comparable to a map, with 
a given key. One serious problem with the claim that ‘models are akin to places and 
characters of literary fiction’ is that it glosses over the numerous types of models, 
which exist in science and therefore cannot capture what is distinct about scientific 
models. 
As a first approach one is struck by several disanalogies between scientific modeling 
and fictional accounts. It can be said that fictional accounts often describe an 
imaginary or possible world. Fiction tells stories, with evolving characters and plot 
lines; it creates characters and depicts situations. Scientific models lack these 
features. The difference between p-representation – the attribution of fictional 
attributes to the model – and t-representation – the denotation of a relation between 
model-system and target system – suggests that a distinction should be made 
between the fictional worlds in literary texts and the hypothetical worlds described in 
scientific models. A fictional world is a make-believe possible world, the result of pure 
imagination. A hypothetical world is an as-if world, that is the model describes the 
world as if it consisted only of the components and relations included in the model. 
Hence it employs abstraction, idealization and the other functions. (As discussed 
below certain sophisticated models in science also provide explanation.) 
Most literary works require an interpretation on the part of the reader or viewer. But 
there is no true interpretation or one key to unlock a literary text. Literary texts mostly 
lack the representational function of scientific models. This lack of a representational 
function also accounts for a disanalogy between literary text and maps. The former 
cannot be approached via a particular key, which is typical for maps. A key for literary 
texts would mean that the key opens the door to the one interpretation of the text (as 
is the case for maps). However, literary texts are typically open-ended and invite 
many different interpretations. Giere has pointed out that a failure of representation is 
a ground for criticism of a scientific model but not of a work of fiction.12 
12Giere, 2008, §3 
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Frigg accepts that there are some ‘salient differences’ between literature and 
scientific modeling.13  Literary plots are complex, scientific modeling is often simple. 
Literary texts do not aim at a specific target system (with possibly one exception, as 
we shall see below). And aesthetic considerations play no role in scientific modeling.  
 The fact that fiction lacks a clear target system has a significant implication: a 
fictional world is a world of its own, in which there is no role for the intricate interplay 
between abstraction, idealization, systematization and factualization. This interplay 
means that many models are capable of de-idealization (or factualization).This 
particular feature is completely absent from fictional accounts. 
Perhaps these disanalogies are just superficial differences. Perhaps the fiction-view 
is true of at least some scientific models, but not of others. To test the accuracy of the 
fiction-view, let us introduce some demons of science, as fictional characters; in 
particular Laplace’s and Maxwell’s Demons. (See Weinert 2016) The French 
mathematician and physicist Pierre-Simon Laplace invoked the services of a 
superhuman being – a Demon – to investigate the properties of a deterministic 
scientific theory, like classical mechanics. To the Laplacean Demon, using the laws 
of classical physics, the whole universe appears like a long film strip, in which every 
frame, in the past, present and future, is already present. 
In a famous thought experiment, involving ‘a being with superior faculties’, James 
Clerk Maxwell attempted to show that the Second law of thermodynamics only 
possessed statistical validity. This being, later dubbed ‘Maxwell’s Demon’, is able to 
‘follow every molecule in its course’. In an appropriate setup such a being would be 
able, says Maxwell, to sort the molecules according to their respective velocities. The 
setup is simply a container, divided into two chambers by a partition, in which there is 
an opening. The Demon’s only work involves the opening and closing of the hole so 
as to allow only the swifter molecules to pass from A to B, and only the slower ones 
to pass from B to A.  
III. Demons as Conceptual Models 
A focus on demons highlights several facts: 
13Frigg, 2010, 125 
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• Demons are conceptual models, which come closest to the idea of fiction. It 
has been suggested that all thought experiments are argument types.14  It is 
questionable whether such a claim is true in its generality but thought 
experiments, like those involving demons, do contain arguments regarding 
particular knowledge claims. At the same time one has to realize that 
conceptual models are only one type of model used in the natural and social 
sciences. There is of course no agreed category or classification of models in 
the sciences. It is unclear from the proponents’ writings whether the fiction-
view of models extends to all models in science. Consider, for instance, the 
functional model of demand and supply curves in economics, the analogue 
model of electric currents or as-if-models of planetary orbits – in all these 
cases it is difficult  to see how the fiction-view can capture the essence of 
these models for they do not represent fictional worlds. It is more accurate to 
say that they represent hypothetical scenarios. There is a difference between 
fictional worlds, which feature in literary works and hypothetical worlds, which 
feature in scientific models. Although the hypothetical worlds of scientific 
models are known to be non-existent, this feature is due to the departure – by 
degrees - from the real target systems, by way of abstraction, idealization etc.. 
In fiction there are no calculated departures from the real world.  On the other 
hand, there are certain types of literary fiction – especially the movement of 
naturalism – which come closer in their characteristics to models in the 
sciences. 
• Demons are hypothetical figures, only realizable in possible worlds; they only 
exist in our minds. They satisfy Giere’s threefold motivation. Demons are 
therefore ideally placed to test the ideas behind the fiction-view of scientific 
modeling. Demons – like Laplace’s or Maxwell’s Demons – serve as thought 
experiments: their function is to test the coherence, consistency and extent of 
accepted knowledge claims, in this case classical physics.  
Laplace employs his Demon to underline his view that the classical world is 
completely deterministic. Laplace bestows three valuable hypothetical attributes to 
his Demon:15 
1. Computational omniscience, i.e. he is able to calculate both the past and 
future history of all systems – both micro- and macro-systems – from their 
current states of affairs.  
The Demon is able to enjoy computational omniscience because he possesses a 
second attribute. 
14Norton, 1996 
15Frigg et al., 2014 
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2. Dynamical omniscience, i.e. he is able to determine the true, not an estimated 
time evolution of the system under consideration. In the Demon’s case 
ontological and predictive determinism coincide. The predictions he makes 
correspond precisely to the actual evolution of the system, the trajectory of 
which he calculates. There is no room for randomness. 
 
Finally the Demon possesses: 
 
3. Observational omniscience, i.e. he is not only able to determine the initial data 
of the current state of affairs from which he will compute both the past and the 
future. Laplace’s Demon is a true inhabitant of the static Block Universe, since 
the whole vista of the course of the universe lies before his all-encompassing 
vision, like the frames of a film strip. Hence for the Demon Past, Present and 
Future seem equally real.  
Thus p-representation is satisfied. What about t-representation? The Laplacean 
Demon t-represents a classical deterministic world. The Demon t-represents this 
classical world in an idealized way. (His representation is idealized because 
determinism does not strictly hold in classical physics, as is most famously illustrated 
by the three-body problem.) It is a hypothetical, not a fictional world because classical 
mechanics assumes that macro-systems exist in the real world and behave 
according to time-invariant deterministic laws. 
Maxwell also bestows hypothetical properties on his Demon: he has the ability to sort 
slow from fast molecules. His aim is to disprove the original assumption that the 
Second law of thermodynamics is a deterministic law. The Demon opens a trapdoor 
between two chambers A and B and only lets one type of molecule, say, fast ones 
enter chamber A. In this way the Demon heats up chamber A and cools chamber B.  
Most significantly Maxwell’s Demon sorts out the molecules without expenditure of 
energy (or so Maxwell claims) and thus achieves a violation of the Second law of 
thermodynamics, as it was understood in the 19th century (as a deterministic law). 
Again p-representation is satisfied and so is t-representation. Maxwell’s Demon 
represents an idealized thermodynamic gas system. It is a hypothetical, not a fictional 
world because statistical mechanics assumes that micro-systems exist in the real 
world and behave according to time-invariant deterministic laws. 
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Although the Demons are idealizations, the intention of their creators is not to tell a 
story about a possible, if fictional world. The intention is to t-represent the real world: 
either the deterministic world of classical mechanics (Laplacean Demon) or the 
probabilistic world of statistical mechanics (Maxwell’s Demon). Novels and plays also 
denote possible worlds but they are particular fictional worlds, which mostly lack a 
particular target system. Yet exceptions exist. There are realistic novels or plays, 
especially belonging to the literary movement of naturalism, which represent ‘real’ 
society. Historical novels belong to this category. Their fictional characters may be 
said to be idealizations. But they still lack a specific feature of scientific models – 
namely the interplay of abstraction, idealization, systematization and factualization. 
An important aspect in scientific modeling is that these functions come in degrees. 
Hence abstraction can be removed, idealization can be factualized, and 
systematization can be improved, making the model more realistic. Thus an analysis 
of classical physics has shown that it is not truly deterministic, in the Laplacean 
sense; and an analysis of statistical mechanics has shown that the Maxwellian 
Demon must fail in his task of separating the fast from the slow molecules. The 
Demon himself is subject to the Second law. 
Thus we have considered the fiction-view both from the point of view of the demons 
of science and from the perspective of (realistic) fiction. Despite first impressions, 
demons, as conceptual models, do not really support the fiction-view of models, 
unless that view simply claims that scientific models often represent idealized worlds. 
But the idealized worlds of fictional accounts and scientific models are not the same 
worlds. Although the demons of science are conceptual models, which seem to 
approximate the fiction-view, they display both p-representation and t-representation. 
They represent hypothetical but not (purely) fictional worlds. Fiction, in general, has 
no particular target system in the real world. It depicts imaginary worlds, perhaps 
inspired by the real world. But realistic novels and plays can be said to have 
generalized target systems, like society or historical epochs. These types of 
conceptual models are more likely to support the fiction-view. Still, differences 
persist. The differences between fictional worlds and hypothetical worlds become 
clearer when we turn to the question of representation, according to which models 
connect theory with reality. 
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IV. Representation 
Frigg characterizes representation as a license to draw inferences from a model to a 
target system.16 Suárez, too, describes representation as surrogate reasoning: infer 
some features of B (target system) by investigating A (source).17 But model 
construction can only occur when some information about the target system is 
available, either of a theoretical or empirical kind.  As discussed below, atom models 
were constructed in order to make sense of the experimental observations about 
them. Once the models were available – Thomson’s plum pudding model and 
Rutherford’s nucleus model – it became possible to draw inferences about the target 
systems. Rutherford effectively inferred from his scattering experiments that the plum 
pudding model was mistaken, since it could not account for the scattering of α-
particles. Such inferences can go astray: the Greeks knew the orbital periods of the 6 
known planets of antiquity and their order, with one exception: from their 
observations they placed the Earth at the centre and made the sun the third planet of 
their geocentric world view. Although the Greeks knew little about the planetary 
system their limited observational knowledge still acted as a constraint on their 
modeling exercises.  
If models involve the drawing of inferences, namely from the model to the target 
system, then modeling involves the notion of representation. But in a scientific 
context more is needed than a license to infer. For a license to infer also exists in the 
fictional context: a reader of a novel, the spectator of a play, is licensed to infer 
certain lessons about what message the novel or the play is intended to convey. The 
reader or spectator is invited to interpret the work of art. Take, for instance, Thornton 
Wilder’s play Our Town (1938). It is a play about the humdrum existence of people in 
a small American community. They follow their daily routines without much thought to 
the higher things in life. There are unfulfilled aspirations, like a trip to Paris. The 
characters go through the cycles of life – from love to loss, from little pleasures to 
great tragedies – as could be observed in any community. The twist of the play 
comes when some of the town characters die and are seen to gather in the afterworld 
from which they observe the goings-on in the town below on Earth. They observe 
proceedings with much incomprehension. Their most striking comment is: ‘they do 
16Frigg, 2010, 98 
17Suarez, 2003, §3 
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not understand!’ As spectators we are licensed to infer a lesson about life: that often 
we do not see the wood for the trees; that we get lost in petty details without realizing 
that there may be higher aspirations in life, grander views to contemplate. That is, we 
are licensed to interpret the message of the play, which may not be identical with the 
intention of the author. Such an interpretation may not be shared by other viewers or 
they may put the emphasis on other features of the play. A literary text is deliberately 
open-ended; it is an invitation to the readers or spectators to make their own sense of 
proceedings.  
What is different in scientific representation is that it requires a certain amount of 
objectivity. How can we capture this objectivity, which acts as a constraint on model 
building? A must have an underlying structure which allows agents to draw specific 
inferences about B.18 According to Frigg, models represent phenomena since 
‘science is about phenomena’.19 These phenomena are represented in models, and 
we are to think of models as ‘generalized maps’. This leads to a two-fold ambiguity of 
the fiction-view. On the one hand we are to think of models as ‘akin to places and 
characters in fiction’; on the other hand, we are to think of models as ‘generalized 
maps’. Maps come with particular keys but literary texts are open-ended. It is this 
open-endedness which makes them unable to provide a particular key of how to 
interpret them. Maps do come with particular keys and do represent particular target 
systems. They are not open-ended. But scientific models, although they represent 
particular target systems, lack particular keys: neither ‘identity’ nor ‘idealizations’ are 
precise keys and they are not exhaustive. 
 
Unlike Thornton Wilder’s fictional town, a ‘map’ aims to represent a real system: an 
underground map of a big city represents, in an idealized fashion, not only the train 
lines and their terminals but the individual stations at which the trains will stop, the 
geographic direction of the line (from east to west, from north to south) and the 
interchanges. That is the maps of the underground trains are much more constrained 
than Thornton Wilder’s fictional account of his ‘little town’. Maps can also be 
improved or ‘factualized’, unlike fictional works. 
18Suárez, 2004, §3 
19Frigg, 2010, 110 
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As mentioned above, Frigg speaks of identity and ideal limits as examples of keys in 
scientific models. These keys are mere hypothesis and according to Frigg, little work 
has been done on keys. Therefore, Frigg soon distances himself from this thesis: 
scientific representation rarely comes with a key. But is a key needed to relate certain 
properties of the model to properties of the target system? R. Giere has introduced 
the notion of ‘fit’ into the discussion to capture the representational relation between 
model and world.  
It is not the model that is doing the representing; it is the scientist using the model 
who is doing the representing. One way scientists do this is by picking out some 
specific features of the model that are then claimed to be similar to features of the 
designated real system to some (perhaps fairly loosely indicated) degree of fit. It is 
the existence of the specified similarities that makes possible the use of the model to 
represent the real system in this way.20 
 
Giere describes ‘fit’, in an unspecified sense, as agreement with data. That is, claims 
about ‘good fit’ do not function as fictitious claims.21 Giere still envisages a loose 
sense of similarity as the relation between models and the world. But we should take 
into consideration that notions like isomorphism and similarity do not really explain 
the representation of reality by a model.22 Suárez has shown that both similarity and 
isomorphism do not possess the logical properties of representation. Representation 
is non-symmetric, non-transitive and non-reflexive. But similarity is reflexive and 
symmetric and isomorphism is reflexive, systematic and transitive. Furthermore 
isomorphism (the structure of A is isomorphic to the structure of B) cannot account 
for inaccurate representation, whilst similarity cannot account for idealized 
representation. The demons do not represent their target system in the sense of 
isomorphism or similarity. In fact, isomorphism and similarity are neither necessary 
nor sufficient for representation. One should add that notions like isomorphism and 
similarity are either used as primitives or fail to specify the degrees of abstraction, 
idealization and factualization, which clearly operate in the case of models. 
20Giere, 2004, §4.1; cf. Bailer-Jones, 2003 
21Giere, 2008, §3 
22Suárez, 2003; 2004; 2010;cf. Frigg, 2010 
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Thus the notions of ‘fit’ (Giere) or ‘key’ (Frigg) are still underdeveloped. But Giere 
also observes that scientific principles and specific conditions constrain the structure 
of models. In what follows I propose to elaborate and explicate the notions of ‘fit’ and 
‘key’ in terms of ‘satisfaction of constraints’. The constraints set up a constraint space 
into which models try to fit. Fit means that the model structure successfully 
accommodates the available constraints.23 Fit, in terms of constraints, secures the 
objectivity involved in scientific models. 
First, constraints will be understood generally as restrictive conditions on 
admissibility. Admittance to certain clubs carries age or even gender limits. 
Admissible are only those who satisfy these particular constraints. Similarly, 
constraints operate on scientific models and theories, which limit the admissible input 
of data. They create ‘logical spaces’, in which models are to be accommodated.  
We can distinguish between empirical constraints, theoretical constraints and 
metaphysical constraints. Empirical constraints consist of (partial) data consistency, 
fundamental physical constants, and empirical laws. Theoretical constraints consist 
of internal consistency, external coherence, mathematical requirements (like 
differentiability or discreteness) and methodological norms (like testability). Einstein, 
for instance, imposed four constraints on scientific theories: 
• The invariance of the velocity of light, c, in vacuum; 
• The Special and General Relativity principles; 
• Invariance and symmetries; 
• Covariance (or form invariance). 
The invariance of the velocity of light was at first simply an empirical constraint but 
Einstein turned it into a postulate of the Special theory of relativity. Metaphysical 
constraints, as conveyed by Laplace’s and Maxwell’s Demons, consist of 
fundamental views about nature, like determinism or indeterminism, continuity or 
discontinuity in nature. As constraints change over time, different constraint 
structures give rise to different logical spaces. It should be immediately obvious that 
fictional accounts satisfy far fewer constraints than scientific models. One expects 
fiction to be internally coherent in the development of the narrative, although even 
this constraint may be violated. There is no limitation on fictional accounts to respect 
23Weinert 2000; Weinert 2006; cf. Bailer-Jones, 2009, Ch. VI, VIII 
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the constraints of physical possibility. For instance, in the film Avatar the image of 
floating mountains takes the viewers by surprise. Note that Laplace’s and Maxwell’s 
Demons do not violate the laws of physical possibility. 
Fit comes in degrees because the constraint space can be manipulated by 
introducing further or more specific constraints. But the more constraints a model 
satisfies the better is its chance of representational accuracy. Fit means that the 
model structure successfully accommodates the empirical and theoretical constraints. 
Models, like the demons, often reflect metaphysical constraints. Constraints should 
enhance a model’s representational force. But an important requirement is that the 
constraints themselves must be accurate. How this particular feature works 
differentially can be gleaned, as discussed below, from the contrast between the 
history of geocentrism and the evolution of atom models. Fit also has a pragmatic 
dimension. It is dependent on the availability of constraints and their interplay. 
Consider, for instance, the Laplacean Demon. As a conceptual model, the Demon 
represents a completely deterministic classical world. The Laplacean Demon can be 
thought of as a superhuman scientist who can explore the resources of classical 
physics to such an extent that he uses it as a deterministic theory representing a 
presumably deterministic world. As it turns out, however, when the limits of classical 
physics are explored it is not as deterministic as the Laplacean Demon pretends. 
When the constraints are tightened and they themselves attain empirical and 
theoretical validity, a model which accommodates the constraints, is likely to be a 
good representation of the target system.  
This tightening of the constraint space is absent from fictional accounts. Novels, 
plays are taken at face value – it is not part of the interpretation whether they 
accurately represent a target system. What matters is their internal consistency and 
the depiction of the characters. As mentioned above, Thornton Wilder’s Our Town 
tells the story of the fictional American small town of Grover's Corners between 1901 
and 1913 through the everyday lives of its citizens. It is not part of the interpretation 
of Wilder’s fictional town to ask whether it accurately represents an American town. It 
could depict any town, at least in the Western World. The only question, which is 
asked, is about the internal consistency of the character development. This facet is 
even more striking in the case of very abstract plays, like Beckett’s Happy Days 
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(1960). The play has two characters, Winnie and her husband Willie. In Act I, Winnie 
is embedded waist-deep in a low mound under blazing light, with a large black bag 
beside her. She is woken by a piercing bell, and begins her daily routine with a 
prayer. She prattles incessantly to her husband Willie, who is hidden from view 
behind the mound and is mostly taciturn. In Act II Winnie’s situation seems to have 
worsened since she has now sunk up to her neck in the mound. But she does not 
seem to realize or to mind, since the incessant flow of her words does not stop or 
even decelerate. The play depicts a situation, which the viewer is invited to interpret. 
But it does not represent a particular target system; it does not provide a key. Winnie 
and Willie do not represent real people, their mound does not represent a real home. 
The play is about a message, not about an accurate or inaccurate representation of a 
target system.  
The constraint space, which operates on scientific models, covers both what Frigg 
calls p-representation and t-representation. When proponents of the fiction-view 
suggest that a model-system describes fictional characteristics, their statement hides 
an ambiguity. Do they mean ‘fictional’ in the sense of an imaginary, make-believe 
world or do they mean an as-if, ‘hypothetical’ world in the sense of abstraction, 
idealization, systematization and factualization? The fiction-view conflates this 
distinction. Whilst Laplace’s and Maxwell’s Demons possess superhuman 
characteristics – the ability to predict and retrodict all micro- and macro-events of the 
classical world or the ability to sort molecules at will according to their speed – these 
characteristics are not purely fictional; they are idealizations of human predictive and 
manipulative capacities. Similar constraints operate on t-representation because, by 
definition, it spells out a relation between the model system and the target system. A 
good model seeks a close fit to the target system by satisfying a number of 
constraints, as a brief excursion into the history of atom models will show below. 
Such constraints do not generally operate on fictional accounts.  
There are certain literary movements – in particular naturalism at the end of the 19th 
century with representatives like E. Zola and G. Hauptmann – which come closer to 
the fiction-view of scientific modeling than other literary genres. Naturalistic novels 
and plays use detailed realism to expose the hardship of life, including poverty, 
violence and disease, of the lower classes. Such naturalistic works of art resemble 
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scientific models in that they ascribe certain realistic characteristics to the characters 
who, in the author’s view, live in unacceptable social conditions. Hauptmann’s play 
The Weavers (1892) portrays a group of Silesian weavers who stage an uprising in 
1844 to protest against the exploitation and inhumane treatment in the wake of the 
Industrial Revolution. The play has a concrete target system, namely the life of a 
community of weavers in a particular part of Germany but it is not a socio-economic 
history of that community. Naturalism imposes more constraints on itself than do 
other literary movements. Scientific models do not have the liberty to dispense with 
constraints. At the opposite end of naturalism stands the work of a writer like Samuel 
Beckett whose novels and plays belong to the movement of the absurd. His 
characters have imaginary and unrealistic features, with no pretence that they may 
depict reality. Nevertheless, they contain messages about reality, which the viewer 
must infer in an act of interpretation. Perhaps the message of Happy Days – but this 
is an interpretation – is that humans gloss over the absurdity of the human condition 
by trivial small talk.  
To say that scientific models are analogous to fiction is to neglect that where there is 
an analogy there is also a disanalogy. If fit is understood in terms of satisfaction of 
constraints it becomes clear that most fictional accounts are subject to very few 
constraints. But in order to secure a representation of a target system by a model 
system, in order to make representation successful, a model system is subject to a 
number of constraints. These constraints are of course flexible and change over time. 
With the introduction of new constraints a model can improve its representation. For 
instance one of the major preconditions for the success of heliocentrism was the 
replacement of the Aristotelian theory of motion by the medieval impetus theory of 
motion. The impetus theory allowed the nominalist philosophers at the University of 
Paris, and indeed Copernicus, to parry some of the major Greek objections against a 
moving Earth. They were based on the Aristotelian theory of motion, according to 
which everything that moves needs a mover; and material objects like the Earth have 
a natural place (the centre) to which they would strive to return if they were removed 
from it.  The Aristotelian theory of motion had allowed the Greeks to reject the notion 
of a moving Earth. For if the Earth moved, contrary to its natural rest, violent winds 
would blow from east to west, buildings would crumble and birds would never be 
seen to fly from west to east. Also objects would not fall straight down to the bottom 
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of a tower. As none of these things were observed, the Greeks concluded that the 
Earth was stationary. The impetus theory allowed the medieval scholastics to point 
out that the atmosphere, the tower, all earthly objects moved along with a naturally 
rotating Earth. The Earth thus had a natural impetus which bestowed, as we would 
say today, inertial motion on the physical systems on the surface of the Earth. This 
shows that if a model is based on inaccurate constraints – like the Aristotelian theory 
of motion – its representational accuracy will suffer. 
The history of atom models reveals the opposite effect, namely how improved 
constraints lead to better models of the atom. The case of atom models confirms that 
representation can only be achieved if the model builder already possesses some 
knowledge of the target system. Important models of the constitution of the atom 
were introduced between 1897 - the year Thomson discovered the electron - and 
1911, when Rutherford inferred the existence of atomic nuclei from the experimental 
evidence of the so-called scattering experiments. The atom models ranged from poly-
electron models to pair models, from Nagaoka's Saturnian model to Rutherford's 
nucleus model.24 It is important to realise that efforts to build atom models of 
increasing agreement with experimental data were driven by the need to interpret the 
mounting experimental data. That is, the models were inferred from the experimental 
data, with little theoretical guidance, since there was no viable theory prior to the 
emergence of the new quantum mechanics in 1925.25 The two types of atom models, 
which will be of particular importance for the discussion in this paper, are Thomson's 
plum pudding model and Rutherford's nucleus model. Rutherford's model of the atom 
succeeded Thomson's in more than a chronological sense. It was Rutherford's use of 
an inference to the most likely explanation, which put an end to the career of the 
plum pudding model. It will be useful to characterise these two models briefly.  
• Thomson's atom model had electrons but no nucleus. The electrons were 
arranged in rings, embedded in a positive sphere of electrification. (Analogy: the 
electrons are like plums swimming in a custard sauce.) But for the sake of 
stability, this model must be dynamic. The electrons move in rings at an angular 
velocity, ω. As we go from the inside of the sphere outwards, the number of 
electrons on the rings increases.  There is a spatial order among the rings to 
guarantee the stability of the atom. The Thomson model was able to cut the 
24See Heilbron, 1981; Pais, 1986, Ch. 9; Weinert, 2000 
25Born, 1949, 86 
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number of electrons, which were supposed to exist in the atom. Early 
speculations had placed thousands of electrons even in the hydrogen atom. By 
relating the number of electrons, n, in an atom to the atomic weight, A, Thomson 
drastically reduced the number of electrons, arriving at approximately one for the 
hydrogen atom. It turned out to be one of the reasons for the demise of the plum 
pudding model that the number of electrons in an atom is not determined by the 
atomic weight, A, but by the atomic number Z. It was the strength of the 
Rutherford model that it could account for this relationship. 
 
• The striking feature of the Rutherford model (1911) was that it acquired a nucleus. 
This was dictated by experiment. Rutherford worried little about the electrons in 
the atom, because due to their small mass, they could not be responsible for the 
scattering, in some cases spectacular, which had been observed. In these 
scattering experiments, α-particles (helium atoms stripped of their 2 electrons) 
were fired at atoms in a thin layer of gold. All kinds of scattering angles were 
observed, but the most surprising result was that 1 in 8000 α-particles suffered 
deflections of more than ninety degrees. This was difficult to accommodate on the 
Thomson model. Rutherford explained that 'the mass, momentum and kinetic 
energy of the α-projectile (were) very large compared with the corresponding 
value of the electron in rapid motion.'26 It was difficult to imagine that the electrons 
could deflect the massive α-particles. By contrast, if the atom acquired a nucleus, 
with a strong central charge, the deflection could easily be explained. If the α-
particle, with positive charge, passes through the charged field of the nucleus, it 
will be deflected at an angle, which depends on the closeness of the approach to 
the nucleus. Using these results, and the relationship between n and Z, 
Rutherford used said inference to discredit the Thomson model. Note that in the 
absence of a theory of atoms, Rutherford’s nucleus model provided an 
explanation of large angle-scattering. 
 
Whilst scientific models undergo change (they can be discarded – like the geocentric 
model - or improved – like atom models) as a result of the interplay of constraints, 
this is not the case with fictional accounts. It is a legitimate objection against scientific 
models that they disregard certain constraints, which can lead to their abandonment. 
But the excessive abstraction of Beckett’s plays and novels is not a valid objection 
against their literary value. Berthold Brecht’s play The Life of Galileo (1945-47) is a 
fictionalized yet realistic account of Galileo’s struggle with the Catholic Church. Even 
Brecht’s play about Galileo gives a very biased account of the behaviour of the 
Catholic Church and their representatives. They are depicted as the forces of 
26Rutherford, 1911, 252-3 
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reaction and orthodoxy throwing spanners in the wheels of the enlightened Galileo. 
The reality was more complex. A scientific model will be criticized for the poor 
representation of its target system; a work of fiction will at best be criticized for the 
poor execution of its plot and delineation of its characters. 
V. Analogies and Disanalogies 
The fiction-view relies on the existence of certain analogies between fiction and 
scientific models, especially the attribution of imaginary characteristics, which in the 
case of scientific models is due to the role of abstraction and idealization. A literary 
movement like naturalism comes closest to the role of scientific modeling but it is only 
one of many literary movements. The analogies are outweighed by the disanalogies, 
which come to light when the many different types of scientific models are taken into 
consideration. Works of fiction are final but scientific models undergo modification; 
the introduction of new constraints can lead to their refinement, as for instance in the 
case of atom models.  De-idealization is an important feature of scientific modeling 
but it is absent from literary fiction. The constraint structure is very different in each 
case: most fictional works are only subject to a few internal constraints, like logical 
consistency, but most scientific models are subject to both internal constraints (like 
logical consistency and mathematical requirements) and external constraints (like 
coherence and testability). With a few exceptions, like the literary movement of 
naturalism, literary works of art fail to represent a clear, specific target system. But in 
the absence of clear target systems, it is impossible – as is the case with literary 
fiction – to assess degrees of abstraction and idealization, hence the extent of 
factualization, which operates in the case of many scientific models. Most planetary 
models assume circular orbits because a circular orbit is easier to compute than an 
ellipsis. But it is well known how much particular planets deviate from circularity: The 
eccentricity of the Earth's orbit is currently about 0.0167, which makes the Earth's 
orbit nearly circular. Mercury has the greatest orbital eccentricity of any planet in the 
Solar System (e=0.2056). By contrast it makes little sense to ask by how much 
Beckett’s, Hauptmann’s or Wilder’s plays deviate from ‘reality’.  
The ascription of certain imaginary, fictional or unrealistic features – p-representation 
– which seems to be present in both scientific models and literary fiction invites the 
analogy, on which the fiction-view of scientific modeling is based. But this similarity is 
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very superficial. In scientific models we observe a depiction of hypothetical scenarios, 
with an interplay of abstraction, idealization, systematization and factualization, which 
make scientific models much more adaptable than literary fiction. In literary fiction 
there simply is no such interplay: works of fiction are not subject to the introduction or 
the refinement of newer constraints. Very few restrictive conditions operate on literary 
fiction – they are not accommodated in well-defined constraint spaces.  The only 
valid similarity between works of fiction and models in science is their use of 
’imagined concrete things’. But the similarity of this function glosses over a distinction 
between fictional features in literary works and hypothetical features in scientific 
models.  
In most literary works of art there is no t-representation, as required in scientific 
models, let alone a key to the interpretation of the text. In the case of scientific 
models it is equally doubtful whether there is a particular key, as Frigg admits, to their 
representational function. The reason is the number of models, which are in 
circulation in science. A scale model of the planetary system does not t-represent in 
the same way, as say, a functional supply-and-demand model in economics. This 
paper has proposed that notions like fit and ‘key’ can be expressed in terms of the 
constraints, which the models must satisfy. Frigg envisages two keys: identity and 
ideal limits. If identity is required – which Frigg describes as the agreement of certain 
facts about the models, say discreteness in atom models, with facts about atoms – 
then this limited identity can be expressed in terms of the constraints, which are 
imposed on the model. (This ‘identity’ cannot be complete because of the 
unavoidable idealization in models.) Scale models tend to agree with certain features 
of the target system – the scale model of a bridge or the solar system shares 
topological features with the target system – but the notion of identity fails to capture 
the degree, to which the model ‘resembles’ the target system. A scale model of the 
solar system can be made more precise by the addition of further constraints: the 
inclusion of moons, the inclusion of all the known planets but it cannot properly 
capture the ‘distance-orbit’ relationship. The notion of constraint also expresses the 
‘key’ of ideal limits better: for instance, the ideal pendulum can be shown to be a limit 
of the physical pendulum by abstracting from certain features: the period of an ideal 
pendulum – 𝑇𝑇 = 2𝜋𝜋√𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑔�  – is only dependent on the length of the string, l, and the 
gravitational constant, g, but not on its mass. The ideal pendulum, which is a model 
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of a real pendulum, abstracts from the mass of the oscillating bob (and the string), 
and idealizes the string to a weightless, inextensible cord of length, l. These 
abstractions and idealizations can be lifted to make the model more realistic. 
Finally, the fiction-view is a hybrid: it emphasizes the attribution of fictional 
characteristics, from which it derives its name. It does not sufficiently distinguish 
between imaginary characteristics, which are purely fictional, and hypothetical 
characteristics, which are abstracted or idealized from real target systems. But it 
cannot neglect the representational function of models, which are absent from (most) 
fictional works of art. So it introduces the map analogy. But maps usually have just 
one key, whilst scientific models are said to exhibit the example keys of ‘identity’ and 
‘ideal limit’. But in the language of constraints, models have many ‘keys’ but keys do 
not possess the adaptability of constraints. The structure of specific target systems 
acts as an important constraint on the objectivity of models in science but no literary 
critic would criticize the lack of objectivity in, say, Beckett’s plays. However, if 
naturalistic novels or plays were to depart too much from their target system, they 
would fail in their task of depicting a real-life situation. The fiction-view shares 
similarities with certain literary movements and conceptual models in the sciences 
but the negative outweigh the positive analogies. This view is not true of scientific 
models in general. 
VI. Conclusion 
The paper has analyzed the fiction-view of scientific modeling and concluded that the 
disanalogies outweigh the analogies. The analogies show certain similarities 
between the fiction-view and thought experiments involving demons, on the one 
hand, and the literary movement of naturalism on the other. But the function of 
representation shows that scientific modeling is quite different from fiction-writing: it 
aims at particular target systems; it exploits the interplay between abstraction, 
idealization, factualization and systematization to great effect; and it is subject to 
many constraints. The paper has proposed to analyze the notion of representation in 
terms of ‘satisfaction of constraints’, as more precise than the notions of ‘fit’ or ‘keys’. 
Scientific models are about hypothetical worlds, not fictional worlds. 
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